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Abstract 
With the objective of controlling the spread of the coronavirus, the UK has decided to 
create and, since 5 May 2020, is live testing a digital contact tracing app, under the 
direction of NHS X, a branch of NHS Digital, and with the help of the private sector. Given 
the lack of details as to what the app will exactly do or not do, there are fears that the 
project will increase government surveillance beyond the pandemic. While I share these 
concerns, I argue that we need to simultaneously tackle one of the most significant, yet 
overlooked, contributors to the problem of government surveillance: our inflated digital 
stems from the non-compliance with data protection laws. A systematic enforcement of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on the private sector would disrupt the current 
dynamics of surveillance which are hidden in plain sight. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Confronted with the Covid-19 public health crisis, more than 30 countries have already 
1 Mobile phone apps are central to these 
efforts.2 The UK has decided to create and, since 5 May 2020, is live testing a digital 
contact tracing app, under the direction of NHS X, a branch of NHS Digital, and with the 
help of the private sector. The app has so far attracted a number of concerns,  correlative 
recommendations,3 and a draft Bill.4 Given the lack of details as to what the app will do, 
fears exist that the project will create a huge data trove, without adequate safeguards, in 
violation of data protection laws and human rights, and with the potential to open the door 
to extensive government surveillance beyond the management of the current public health 
crisis.  
 
I share those concerns and agree with the various recommendations put forward but I 
argue that we need to simultaneously tackle one of the most significant, yet overlooked, 
1 
The Guardian, 14 April 2020.  
2 
considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-
April 2020. 
3 Ibid.; academics in: Medium, 23 March 
-19 & Tech ; House of 
-384, 28 April 2020; Joint 
Committee -19: Digital 
 
4 Initially, an academic initiative, 
protections for digital in
https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/yc6xu/
Covid-19 (Coronavirus) Contact Tracing A  
contributors to the problem of government surveillance: our inflated digital footprint, the 
elevated to a business model and left largely unchallenged.5 To do so requires the 
systematic enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the UK 
Data Protection Act 2018 on the private sector so as to disrupt the current dynamics of 
surveillance which are hidden in plain sight. 
 
After a brief outline of the data protection law framework applicable to the processing of 
personal data in general, I will sketch the main elements of the controversy surrounding 
the app before explaining its context, i.e. the surveillance business model that part of the 
private sector has adopted, in violation of data protection laws. I will thereafter highlight 
the resulting dynamics and why they need challenging, concluding that enforcement by 
the UK data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner Office (ICO) should play 
a central role in altering these dynamics, beyond the Covid-19 crisis. 
 
II. The Backdrop: The Data Protection Law Framework 
 
The GDPR, like the Directive 1995/46/EC it replaced on 25 May 2018, established a 
number of legal requirements for the processing of persona data. The principles are the 
necessity (not just convenience of processing) and proportionality of the processing as to 
the types of data collected, the purposes for which they are used, the time during which 
they are needed for processing, and the legal grounds to justify the processing.6 
Controllers, who decide the purposes and means of processing, should ensure compliance 
with the above principles and demonstrate compliance. Processors acting on behalf of 
controllers have, since the GDPR, a much more pro-active role in ensuring compliance, 
 
 
Compliance with data protection laws is not a tick-box exercise to be undertaken after the 
digital technology has been created. In case of high risk processing, such as health data 
processing, data protection impact assessments have become mandatory, so as to 
mitigate risks, and if mitigation is not possible, to decide whether the processing should be 
pursued at all. 7  Compliance with human rights is also central to data protection by design. 
8 Indeed, the ultimate objective of all these rules, in the GDPR (Recital 4) and in the 
e 
these sets of obligations. 
 
III. The Controversy Surrounding the UK Digital Contact Tracing App 
 
NHS X leads the development of the app, with the help of the private sector. It thus 
determines the purpose and means of processing, and as a data controller, needs to 
ensure compliance with the key principles. The companies it works with are likely to be 
considered as processors, acting on behalf of NHS X which should instruct them to 
5 Julie E Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The fight for a 
human future at the new frontier of power (London: Profile Books, 2019). 
6 Articles 5 and 6 GDPR, very similar to Articles 6 and 7 Directive. 
7 Article 35 GDPR. 
8 Recital 4 GDPR; the ICO Elizabeth Denham, 
-19: h -14, 4 May 2020.  
implement data protection by design. The little information NHS X has so far provided has 
remained scattered and vague.9 The app processes Bluetooth data to be stored in a 
-19 test results 
and the details of the 111 call,10 but without further details beyond the potential or likelihood 
of adding geolocation data in a future iteration of the app.11 This  centralised approach 
understand the spread of the disease and hot spots of infections. Hence doubts as to 
implementing data minimisation.  Furthermore, the exact purposes for which the data will 
be used have not been explained, beyond a vague reference to tracing and research, 
raising issues as to compliance with the purpose limitation. Time limitation is also a 
cannot be deleted.12  
 
Regarding the legal grounds to justify processing, NHS X has continuously indicated that 
consent will be sought, presenting consent as an indicator of its commitment to privacy 
and the law.13 It is however extremely unlikely that consent can justify the processing, 
especially for research, in light of the long standing EU guidance on data protection 
consent,14 specifically repeated for Covid-19 tracing apps.15 NHS X seems to confuse the 
voluntary nature of using the app with the legal justification for processing data, despite 
the ICO having expressly pointed out the difference.16 This betrays wider issues as to the 
understanding of the law and the nature of the conversations with the ICO. 
 
To reassure critics, NHS X has finally opened the source code of the app, but not of the 
datastore,17 and published the data protection impact assessment (DPIA),18 voluntarily 
submitted the DPIA to the ICO.19 20 
capability have not abated. In fact, the JCHR appears to be alarmed by the speed of the 
piloting and intended roll out.21 Data protection by design requires to pause and ascertain 
those risks before the app is rolled out, not afterwards. 
9 Only two official statements -of 28 March and 28 April 2020-, with information added when Matthew 
Gould, head of NHS X, testified before the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on 28 
April 2020, and the JCHR on 4 May 2020. 
10 
https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2020/03/28/the-power-of-data-in-a-pandemic/. 
11 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q340, 376. 
12 Matthew Gould, Q20, -
19: human -14.  
13 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q 326, 340, 341, 364, 366; 
-
265, Q17. 
14  
Now replaced by 
2020. 
15 ssing of personal data in the context of the COVID-19 
 
16 -  
17 Source code of the digital contact tracing Covid- , https://github.com/nhsx.  
18 DPIA. 
19 
-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2020/05/dpia-for-the-nhsx-s-trial-of-contact-tracing-app.  
20 Prof Lilian Edwards, House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 4), Q362. 
21 -  12; 
(virtual proceeding): The Gove - Q 17. 
 that this approach will not suffice. Once we start looking at the digital contact app from the 
perspective of the digital ecosystem and our massive digital footprint,22 the app can hardly 
23  
 
IV.  Contextualising the Controversy: A Business Model Resulting in Surveillance 
 
Our society tolerates commercial practices that result in massive and intrusive 
surveillance, which if they had originated from governments, we would be, I submit, up in 
arms. Because they come from the private sector and are more diffused, lost in an 
ecosystem so opaque that we do not know exactly what our digital footprint consists of and 
who has access to it,24 we have not opposed them. Let us look at Bluetooth which the 
digital contact app will use. Bluetooth has been invented for connecting two devices, for 
the iBeacon for apps to micro-target consumers in stores.25 Bluetooth is now ubiquitous in 
tracking of their movements.26 Thus, while Bluetooth has undeniable benefits, it also has 
an inherent capacity for surveillance. 
 
Now, let us imagine the following Covid-19 scenario. The lockdown has eased, an 
employer interviews three different individuals, hiding from each a smartphone with the 
app on.27 Each interviewee has the app; one tests positive for Covid-19; the interviewer 
receives notification. Will the interviewer decide that hiring the interviewee is not worth the 
risk, or on the contrary, in the (false?) belief that herd immunity can be built on, will it favour 
the interviewee who had Covid-19, as employers and slave owners used to do for those 
who contracted the yellow fever in 19th century New Orleans?28 Whichever decision the 
modern employer will take, how will the interviewees know whether the positive testing for 
Covid-19 influenced the decision? The current debate on the Covid-19 digital contact 
tracing app has not really pointed out this inherent risk of misuse, independently of whether 
a decentralised or centralised approach is adopted. 
 
More generally, given the wide use of Bluetooth in the private sector, where are the studies 
on the resulting surveillance? If iBeacon had been invented by a governmental intelligence 
agency, would our reaction have been different? Surveillance in Western countries is still 
22 
Commun. Assoc. Computing Machinery 28, no. 10 (1985). The author, at the origins of key elements of 
cryptography and the dark web, is cited in the PEPP-PT project, which is somewhat ironic given the 
criticisms of surveillance for the PEPP-PT project, PEPP-PT (n. 39). 
23 Joanna Cherry, considering the app as something new, Member of the 
- Q4 p10. 
24 See the work of ICSI UC Berkeley and IMDEA Networks, "The Haystack Project," 21 February 2020, 
https://www.haystack.mobi. 
25 Mic New York Times, 14 
June 2019. Nic Newman. Apple iBeacon technology briefing. J Direct Data Digit Mark Pract 15, 222 225 
(2014). 
26 Ibid.  
27 The scenario is not mine, see (in French) 
Analyse de risques à destination des non- -tracage.fr. 
28 
Historical Review 425. 
associated with state agencies, but they do not need anymore to directly collect data when 
sector. When in 2013, Snowden revealed the PRISM programme, it became clear that the 
NSA focused on building its capacity to aggregate and analyse the data, relying on US 
private companies to give the data.29  
 
We live in a digital ecosystem where many of the innovative digital technologies we use 
have been developed in direct opposition to the core legal principles of data protection by 
design. Instead of minimising processing to what is needed to provide a service, a number 
of businesses have thrived on collecting as much data as possible from consumers, often 
ofiling to 
data brokers. The context directly related to the Covid-19 digital contract tracing apps is 
risks it creates. Apps on smartphones, fitbits, smartwatches, now abound that collect 
various health information: the number of steps per day, the speed of the walk/run, weight, 
height, BMI, and/or various medical health information the user can enter. Many of these 
health apps violate the GDPR by collecting far too much data, for too long, without 
transparency, and without securing the data.30  
 
As a result, the private sector has access to a granularity of information that can be 
shocking. Nowadays, an insurer -who acquires supposedly anonymised data from a 
supermarket loyalty scheme to feed into its predictive algorithm- can identify a client who 
buys fennel as a healthy conscious consumer who is unlikely to be of high risk, and who 
thus should be offered a lower premium.31 Fennel in the UK is a luxury vegetable that not 
discrimination and of further entrenching the inequalities of our society. 32 Yet, the impact 
on human rights and on the social fabric of our society is barely understood. Over time, 
the surveillance resulting from this business model is proving to be no less dangerous to 
human rights than those of governments.  
 
In light of this context, the concerns as to government surveillance through the building of 
the digital contact tracing app take a different resonance. Undoubtedly, we should ensure 
that it does not happen, and the safest way to do so is to entrench safeguards in primary 
legislation. Nevertheless, we should be equally concerned about the possible actions from 
the private sector and the dynamics that they contribute to. Transparency and 
accountability should be demanded not just of government, specifically here NHS X, but 
also of the private sector involved in the project. This discussion has largely been missing, 
despite data protection laws constituting an excellent starting point to challenge the current 
dynamics of the project.  
 
29 
The Guardian, 7 June 2013. 
30 As the Belgian Data Protection Authority stated on 31 March 2020, 
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/le-covid-19-et-lutilisation-dapplications-de-sante; Norway 
https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/no-undersokelsekategori/report-out-of-control/. 
31 
at https://www.noted.co.nz/tech/tech-tech/how-algorithms-can-go-rogue-whos-at-the-wheel.  
32 The Guardian, 27 
September 2018.  
V. Revisiting the Controversy: The Need to Challenge the Dynamics of the Digital 
Contact Tracing App Project 
 
NHS X indicated it works notably (but not exclusively) with Microsoft, Google, Palantir, 
Amazon Web Services and Faculty AI.33 Because the government does not have the in-
house expertise to build these apps, that it resorted to the private sector should not 
surprise. This collaboration however needs to respect the rules set out in the GDPR, 
notably Article 28 GDPR. Controllers have to choose processors who can demonstrate 
compliance 
record does not give full confidence, controllers can refuse to choose them.34 Furthermore, 
processors have the duty to assist controllers in fulfilling their obligations, with an 
expectation to be pro-active (Article 28(3) GDPR). The problem is that NHS X has chosen 
companies whose implementation of the GDPR has been recently challenged either 
formally, by a data protection regulator, or informally by academic scientists.  
 
Google has been found twice in breach of data protection laws; 35  and a complaint for its 
use of a tracking ID on Android has just been filed before the Austrian Data Protection 
Authority.36  
November 2018, the Dutch Government concluded that its processing of personal data for 
a wide range of its products37 violated the GDPR core principles (data, purpose and time 
limitations). The EU regulator reached the same conclusions in its preliminary 
investigation.38 Has the impact of these findings of non-compliance been assessed on the 
UK contracts in general and on the development of the Covid-19 app in particular? 
Furthermore, in May 2019, Palantir, which business model is based on buying and selling 
huge troves of (personal) data,39 was criticised for selling to the US immigration agency 
tracking software that enables the agency to take decisions in breach of human rights.40  
 
Consequently, doubts as to whether NHS X has complied with Article 28(1) GDPR arise. 
That NHS X could not confirm, a week before the restricted launch of the app, that Apple 
and Google would be forbidden to turn off the app at any point, despite having the power 
to delete the app from their stores, does not give full confidence that NHS X has ensured 
33 Gould, Joshi, and Tang (n. 10). House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q302-
384. 
34 concepts of controller, processor and joint controllership under 
 
35 (in English) -2019-001 of 21 January 2019 
19, https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-
restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc, paras. 105, 109. 
36 By the NGO NYOB, 13 May 2020, https://noyb.eu/en/complaint-filed-against-google-tracking-id. 
37 A summary by those who audited the firm is available at 
https://www.privacycompany.eu/blogpost-en/new-dpia-on-microsoft-office-and-windows-software-still-
privacy-risks-remaining-long-blog. For the full reports: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/06/11/data-protection-impact-assessment-
windows-10-enterprise. 
38 n to better protect rights 
 
39 -mining company is using 
War on Terror tools to track American citizens. The scary thing? Palantir is desperate for 
Bloomsberg Business Week, 19 April 2018. 
40 The 
Guardian, 31 May 2019. 
that the companies only act on its instructions.41 Similarly, if the companies hired are not 
already fully compliant, doubts exist as to whether they are in a position, for example, to 
point out to the controller that its instruction may violate the GDPR (Article 28(3) GDPR). 
violation is likely? 42 while laudable, may well not suffice if the 
structures for compliance are inadequate. Trust in the project cannot rest on the hope that 
things will turn out all right, especially at a time of crisis. 
 
To summarise, when each partner of a project experiences their own difficulties in 
complying with data protection laws, their collaboration has the potential to multiply the 
risks of non-compliance and human rights violations. The GDPR provides the tools to 
challenge these dynamics.43 Difficult questions can be asked, but the answers do not have 
to be provided to the general public. It falls therefore on the data protection regulator, in 
the UK the ICO, to question decisions that potentially violate the GDPR. So far the Judicial 
 44 More importantly maybe, the Committee had already noted in 2019 a wider 
place to enforce the GDPR and DPA in relation to how internet companies are using 
personal data, including consideration of whether the ICO has the resources necessary to 
45 In May 2020, the recommendation is to create a specific 
monitoring body for real-time auditing. In the long term, is this a viable solution? Lack of 
enforcement leaves a vacuum, where others are forced to take decisions which are not 
within their role46 and which they do not want to take.47 It would be more beneficial to 
e, not the least by internally separating its roles of 
advisor, investigator and decision-maker, as the Financial Conduct Authority does, to avoid 
inherent conflicts of interests.48   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The pandemic has revived fears of governments creating or extending massive 
surveillance programmes under the cover of fighting the coronavirus and exiting the 
lockdown. I have demonstrated that the NHS X project suffers from enough flaws with 
regard to data protection laws to give substance to these fears: a lack of transparency, the 
recurring vagueness of the little information provided, and the choices made regarding the 
processors when their compliance with data protection laws can be patchy. 
 
41 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q 358, 383  it is commendable though 
to ask for time to check the answer. 
42 Matthew Gould,  
43 But it will not resolve some issues of data sharing facilitated by other legislations, as correctly pointed out 
by Michael Veale, -19: 
 
44 -19: human rights 
 Q17.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ada Lovela  10. 
47 Microsoft called for regulation of facial recognition, -
UK Reuters, 17 April 2019. 
48 The ICO did not see the conflict, 
to Covid-  
Nevertheless, these fears should not mask that part of the private sector indulges into 
building our digital footprint and use it to extensively monitor us, independently of what 
governments do. Fitbits and health apps on smartphones are the latest expression of a 
business model based on little to no compliance with data protection laws. It should be of 
no surprise then that these businesses pay lip service to privacy rights and to the broader 
range of human rights which the technology may or will interfere with. In that sense, 
 the last step of a process that has started in 
part of the private sector. If neither side has an internal culture of compliance, how can 
they be expected to take responsibility to ensure all safeguards are in place? 
 
To their discharge, the poor enforcement of data protection laws has not contributed to 
foster a strong culture of compliance with data protection laws. Time has come for a 
systematic enforcement of the GDPR, which would ultimately bear fruits beyond the 
decisions taken on specific controllers and processors. The minimisation of processing, 
and thus of our digital footprint, would become an entrenched habit for all technology 
developers, with the ripple effect that any deviation would stand out and be easier to 
challenge. Convenience and functionality of digital technologies do not have to trump the 
necessary standards of security, privacy, and human rights. It is time to create an 
for those that serve short term interests destructive of the fabric of our society.  
 
  
